A

SERMON,

PREACHED

JUNE the 17th. 1688.

Upon the

BIRTH

OF THE

PRINCE.

By *John Turner*, Hoſpitaller of St. *Thomas Southwark.*

Licenſed, *June* the 19th. 1688.

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JUDG. 17. 6.

In those days there was no King in Israel, *but every Man did that which was right in his own Eyes.*

WE have already taken an imperfect View of the Miseries and Calamities to which Anarchy, or the Want of Government, in a Nation is exposed; which are so many, and so great,

that they want Numbers and Magnitudes to expreſs them by, their Nature is ſo exquiſitely cruel, their Aggravations and Circumſtances ſo barbarous and horrid, their Proportion ſo large, their Sum ſo vaſt and infinite, that there is no Landskip of Confuſion able to deſcribe them, no Imagination ſo fruitful as to repreſent them, no Conception ſo diſcerning as to reach or comprehend them, no Volume, no Library ſo large as to contain them, and to inſiſt Particularly, as even a common Fancy and Experience might do upon the Calamities and Hardſhips, with which ſuch a State is naturally encompaſſed, is but to fright and diſcompoſe our ſelves without any End or Meaſure, by raiſing up the pale Ghoſts, and rueful Apparitions of the moſt miſerable Realities that the World affords.

If therefore we reflect only in general upon the Bleſſings of Government, which is no other than an imperfect Draught of that Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs by which this Univerſe was made at firſt, and is ſupported till now, and by which the diſagreeing Seeds and Principles of Things are reduced into a perfect Concord and Harmony with each other, for the Defence and Preſervation of the Whole; yet

yet this alone will afford us ſufficient Matter of Thankfulneſs to Almighty God, that he is pleaſed to give us ſo fair and comfortable a Proſpect, by a Male Branch added to the Royal Family, notwithſtanding thoſe Sins of ours that call ſo loud for Vengeance at his Hands, that yet the Scepter ſhall not depart from *Judah*, nor a Law-giver from between his Feet.

There is no Form of Government ſo bad, or ſo ill contrived, but it is ſtill infinitely better than no Government at all, and not only the Deſtruction of Government it ſelf, but even the Alteration of the moſt inconvenient Eſtabliſhment, if it have been of any long Continuance, is uſually ſo fatal to Mankind, by being expoſed to the interfering Ambitions and Deſigns of Men that ſeek themſelves, and yet cannot all be gratified as they deſire; that an everlaſting Submiſſion to the ſame unhappy Circumſtances, is much more deſirable to the Wiſe and Good, than thoſe Convulſions and Agonies of State, thoſe Throws and Pangs of an uſually Abortive Birth, that are by experience found to be the conſtant Attendants of real or pretended Reformations.

It is not material at this Time and Place, to examine very nicely and ſcrupulouſly into theſe things, but this one may affirm upon a very ſlight Speculation, that of all ſorts of Governments, a Democracy or Common-Council is certainly the worſt, and it is ſtill ſo much worſe or better in it ſelf, as it is divided into more or fewer Hands; for though *Solomon* tells us very wiſely, and like himſelf, *That in the Multitude of Councellors there is Safety*; yet this is never true but only in *Solomon*'s Caſe, where there is a King and a wiſe Man at the Helm, who having heard the Opinions of all Parties, and having a perfect Light into the Affair then lying in conſideration before him, is afterwards at liberty, without Appeal, to accept of any, or to reject all theſe Advices, as he ſhall judge moſt expedient for the common Good; but otherwiſe, the contrary of this is rather true, that in the Multitude of Councellors there is Confuſion, and by how much the more numerous this Multitude is, ſo much the greater will the Confuſion be, becauſe it is ſtill ſo much the nearer approach to Anarchy it ſelf; where Men being ty'd by no Band of Obligation, and being divided in Humor or Opinion, every Man's private Judg-

Judgment is his private Law, his Square and Meaſure, and his Rule of Action, and every Man is a Governour and a Government diſtinctly by himſelf; the Conſequence of which muſt needs be very diſmal, and the Effects as bloody as Cruelty, Suſpition, Hatred, Avarice, Ambition, and every evil Appetite, and inordinate Deſire, as together in a ſad and tragical Confederacy can make them.

And if Democracy, or the Rule of many be the worſt of Governments, becauſe of the nearneſs of its Approach to Anarchy, or no Government at all; then is Ariſtocracy, or the Government of a few, and thoſe of the better and the nobler Sort, not in it ſelf a deſirable ſort of Government, but only comparatively better than the other; for in this Caſe, there being no Sovereign and Supream Will that ſhall determine Differences, and put an end to Diſagreements in Opinion or Deſign, it will be impoſſible ſome time or other, and there is apparent Danger of it every Moment, but that Offences muſt come, Diviſions, Fewds and Animoſities muſt ariſe; and theſe being back'd by the Intereſt or Dependencies of the Reſpective Parties, will infallibly produce that which we call a Civil or Inteſtine War.

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We may take the Meaſure of theſe things from this Conſideration, that as the World divided and canton'd into ſeveral Nations, is govern'd for the moſt part by ſeveral Supream Heads, ſo all theſe ſeveral Princes, if we ſhould preſume to be ſo hardy to ask them ſeverally the Queſtion, would pretend a Concern, though more immediate, for their own Subjects; yet more or leſs for the Happineſs of Mankind, and for the univerſal Peace and Quiet of the World; but ſtill they have different Sentiments and Interfering Ambitions, by which it comes to paſs, that they have ſo often mutually recourſe to the Sword, when all other Expedients of Accommodation fail.

Now though every Nation or Empire be governed ſeparately by a reſpective Head, yet if all theſe Soveraigns could agree together for the Good of the Whole, as well as in particular of their own reſpective Dominions, we might ſay of the World in general, that its Government was Ariſtocratical, and the Jars that happen betwixt independent Princes, purſued into their true Original and Fountain, that is to ſay, the interfering Paſſions and Deſigns of Men, may ſerve experimentally to repreſent to us the manifeſt Inconveniences to which

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that Government is naturally obnoxious, in which there is not one Sovereign and Supream Pilot to manage and put an Iſſue to Debates; from whoſe Determination there ſhall be no Appeal, and without whoſe Conſent, either Expreſs or Implicit, there ſhall be no political Adminiſtration.

The Reſult of all which, is, that a Monarchy is the beſt and moſt perfect Form of Government, and that the Errors and Failures of a Monarch, though he ſhould be guilty in any particular Inſtance of Male-Adminiſtration, either through Ignorance, Inadvertency or Deſign, yet are much more wholſome and tolerable in a State, than the Miſeries that ariſe from the Feuds and Diſagreements of Equals and Competitors in the Management of Affairs, where the Ambition of a private Intereſt, or the Diſgrace and Deſtruction of a Rival, or the Stiffneſs and Opiniatrity of a Man that diſdains to be thought in a Miſtake, and will have every thing go his own way, is much more regarded than the Welfare of the Public; and as God ordained Man to be the nobleſt Inhabitant of this lower World, the Prince of the Univerſe, and the Image of himſelf, ſo for the ſame Reaſon, it muſt needs be moſt pleaſing and acceptable to him, when

the Conduct of Societies is an Image of his Providence in the Goverment of the World, in which himſelf is only the Supream, and all other Subſiſtences, whether in Heaven or Earth, have an abſolute and unchangeable Dependance upon him.

Again, as Monarchy is the beſt of Governments, ſo is an Hereditary Monarchy the beſt of Monarchies, and that for two Reaſons.

Firſt, becauſe an Elective one upon every Vacancy, is ſo ſubject to engage Factions, and to embroil different Parties, and diſagreeing Intereſts in ſtrong and dangerous Competitions againſt each other; and though the Election may poſſibly be managed without the Deciſion of a Battle to determine it, yet it leaves a Ferment in a State which does not eaſily evaporate and purge it ſelf; but upon every occaſion it will be ſhewing the Malignity and Virulence of its Nature, it will render the Councels of a Nation ſo entangled and perplex'd, and the Execution of thoſe Councils ſo uncertain, by the latent Treachery of diſaffected Parties, and by the mutual Animoſities that are every where mingled, and that divide Cities, Towns and Families, and daſh even Conſanguinities, Affinities and Friendſhips, with a barbarous Rage

Rage and Violence againſt each other; that even the wiſeſt Councils will be diſappointed of Succeſs, and the moſt vigorous Conduct will find it ſelf diſarmed, when it pretends to a ſteady Execution.

Secondly, The Kingdom of an Elective Monarch is not conſidered by him as his Patrimony, as indeed it cannot be, but only as his Farm. He looks upon himſelf only as a Tenant for Life, and therefore, without conſidering the Intereſt of his People, he is under a very great and manifeſt Temptation to look at nothing ſo much as the Grandeur of his Family, which Inheritance provides for, but Election does not; and therefore as it is with ſome Farmers, when their Leaſe is near expiring, and they have no Hopes of Renewing any more, they will be ſure to leave it as Untenantable as they can; the Ground impoveriſh'd, and the Houſe out of Repair, and the Barns and Stables in ſuch a tottering Condition, that even the Rats forſake them. Juſt ſo it is, or is at leaſt not unreaſonably to be fear'd and apprehended in Elective Princes, that they ſhould mind nothing ſo much as the Aggrandizing themſelves, and leaving a Princely Inheritance to their Deſcendants, though it be

gotten by nothing but Rapine and Injuſtice, and by the Oppreſſion of thoſe whom they are ſo ſtrictly and ſolemnly obliged to cheriſh and protect; and for the ſame reaſon, it is uſually ſeen in *Vice-Roys* and Lievtenants, that they are much more oppreſſive than their Maſters that ſent them, becauſe the one have an Inheritance, the other have not; an Hereditary King hath his People for his Patrimony, and the Demeſnes of the Crown are a plentiful, unalienable, and indefeiſable Eſtate to him and to his Children for ever, and therefore he will not willingly abuſe his Patrimony, or ſuffer his own Eſtate by Male-Adminiſtration to run to Ruine or Decay; and though his Title be unqueſtionable, and all his Actions are without appeal, and without any further Reſort beyond himſelf, yet he will always think himſelf more ſafe and happy in the good Affections, good Wiſhes, and hearty Prayers of his People, than in exaſperating and provoking them to ſuch an Extremity againſt his Perſon and Government, as the Generality of Mankind, too little inſtructed in the Duty of Subjection, in the Leſſon of Obedience, and in the comparative Happineſs of the worſt of Governments, in reſpect to Anarchy, Confuſion,

and

and Civil War, are naturally unable to endure.

Besides that, in Leagues and Treaties of Alliance, in Wars or Expeditions for the common Safety, as a bad Minister, or a covetous General may betray his Prince, so may an Elective Prince betray his Country, and sell that Interest which he pretends to maintain. For Gold is every thing to an ambitious King, that hath no Hopes of Succession for his Children; but a Successive Monarch can propound no Interest, no Advantage to himself, but only in the Strength and Glory of his Country; he is Poor in its Poverty, and Wealthy in its Riches; in its Greatness glorious, and in its Tranquillity happy. An Elective Monarch, if he be not otherwise a Person of more than ordinary Constancy and Virtue, is, or may be, liable to very strong Temptations, to be at least wanting in the Duty of a King, which consists in promoting, with his utmost Vigor, the Interest and Welfare of his Country; but in Hereditary Kings, the Temptation lyes clearly on the other side, because his Happiness is twisted and interwoven with the Interest of his Subjects, and he can never rationally promise any private Emolument or Advantage to himself

ſelf that ſhall redound to the Prejudice of the Public in the General conſidered, which when it is Rich and Powerful, makes the Prince to be ſo, though it may ſo happen under a Deſpotic and Arbitrary Prince, that ſome particular Perſons may be oppreſt, and their ſeparate Intereſts may be wrongfully invaded, but ſtill the Encouragement of Trade, the Patronage of Virtue, the Propagation of Commerce, the Improvement of Navigation and all uſeful Arts, the rendering himſelf Powerful and Formidable abroad, and the endeavouring to make himſelf lov'd and admired at Home, in the general Courſe and Tenor of his Actions, are things that are ſo manifeſtly for his undoubted Intereſt, as well as Honour and Greatneſs, that he can never propoſe any true Advantage to himſelf in a wilful Contravention to any of theſe Deſigns.

And what is true of an Elective Prince, is ſo of Democracies and Ariſtocracies too, as they are obnoxious to Factions and inteſtine Brangles, to the Danger, if not Ruine of the common Safety; ſo alſo by reaſon of their very Number, which is the thing in which ſome think their Security is placed, they are much more

more ſubject than Elective Monarchies to Bribery and Corruption: For what will not a poor Spirit, or an immoderately ambitious do, in whatſoever Station he appears, to ſecure great Riches and Poſſeſſions to himſelf? He is but ſo much the worſe for being put into a Place of Truſt, and making the Figure of a Patriot in the Senate, becauſe Opportunity gives Strength to the Temptation, and makes an otherwiſe governable Paſſion to become of a ſudden maſterleſs and unruly; nay, ſometimes in Democracies they connive at one another, to fatten themſelves upon the public Spoils, as we our ſelves have experienced in this very Age and Nation, and when there is no Monarch actually in the Throne, it is natural for haughty and ambitious Men to endeavour to climb into the empty Seat, and the forming and diſappointing ſuch Deſigns as theſe, is that which puts a Republic in a conſtant Ferment, and makes it liable to perpetual Danger; we know how many Inſtances of this there are to be met with in the Roman Government, and to paſs by ſome ſmaller and leſs conſiderable Attempts in the Dawning and Infancy of that Common-wealth, the Conſpiracy of *Catiline* had probably a King at the

the bottom, and so had the bloody Wars between *Sylla* and *Marius*, and between *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, till at last the Crown setled upon the Head of *Augustus*, who was the first great Sovereign of the *Roman Empire*; and it is observable, that our Blessed Saviour deferred his coming till the Monarchy was established, as being much the most peaceful sort of Political Administration, and therefore the most suitable to his Character and Person; for so *Orosius* expresly observes, that Christ was born in the Forty second Year of *Augustus*, when the Empire was confirmed and setled in his Person, by the Destruction and Overthrow of his Rivals in it, and when having concluded a firm Peace with the *Parthians*, the Temple of *Janus* was the third time shut up, from the building of *Rome* to that Day, and Peace was restored to the habitable World.

And if we look a little backward, into the Times before these, during the Continuance of that vast Republic, we shall not only find such dangerous Competitions betwixt the Men of greatest Power and Authority in the Senate, and among the People, as called aloud for one Supream Head, to appease those Tumults and Disorders, by taking the Sole Power

Power of Government into himſelf, but all the Roman Provinces were ſhamefully expoſed to Plunder and Oppreſſion by the Connivance of Grandees at one another, who took the Care of ſuch Governments upon them, not for the Sake of the People, but their own, that by Rapine and Extortion they might gather up vaſt Treaſures into their own private Coffers, and become Rich by the Fruits of Oppreſſion and Injuſtice; but the Emperors, however Lawleſs and Arbitrary they might be themſelves, yet would not eaſily ſuffer ſuch Wickedneſs in their Miniſters, which was the reaſon that Monarchy, when that Empire grew to ſuch an unweildy Bulk, was certainly for the Intereſt of the Roman State, and that Form of Government, whatſoever it be, which is beſt ſuited and qualified for the regular and peaceable Adminſtration of ſo vaſt an Empire, is certainly the moſt perfect in it ſelf, and the moſt exactly calculated, that humane Prudence and Fore-ſight can arrive to, for the univerſal Peace and Happineſs of Mankind.

But to reſume the Compariſon betwixt an Elective and Succeſſive King, a Succeſſive Monarch is truly and properly the Father of

his Country, he hath attain'd by a long Course of Lineal Descent, a kind of natural Affection for it, the Love of his People from his Childhood upward, grows up and encreases together with himself, and becomes the habitual exercise of his Mind; the Care of its Prosperity circulates with his Blood, and fills every Vein of his Heroic Heart with a Noble and a Generous Passion for its Welfare; but to an Elective King, the Kingdom is his Ward, of which he resolves to make the utmost Advantage, and if he cannot marry the Ward and the Son together, which is the Thing he unquestionably aims at, and is as unquestionably opposed in his Design, he is under a Temptation, by embezling the Patrimony, and interverting the Revenues of the Crown, to the Use of that Person and Family that is deny'd to wear it any longer, to endeavor that it may not be so good a Fortune to any other Pretender.

An Hereditary King is trained up to Majesty, by Steps that are insensible to himself, he draws in an Air of Greatness with his Breath, and the Magnificence of an Imperial State becomes so easie and familiar to him before he steps into the Throne himself, that he charms

charms the whole World into Reverence and Admiration, by the Sweetness and Humanity that is twisted with his Power, and by the unaffected sitting of so much Greatness upon him, and he wins them so easily to himself, by a Mine compounded of Majesty and Love, that he hath more than the Interest of an Elective Prince added to the Right and Title of a Successive.

But now an Elective King is usually chosen for such Qualifications as would make a Successive less acceptable to his People; he is usually of a rough hewn and impolish'd Temper, season'd in Difficulties, and inur'd to Dangers, impatient and restless with Designs of Greatness, and with a Desire of bearing down all that oppose them; for in an Elective Kingdom the Crown hath many Rivals, and even the Prospect of Succession in a future Reign, creates many and dangerous Competition in the Present, and when it comes to a Choice, the Choice is managed as the *Romans* of old time voted for their Consuls in the Field of *Mars*; the Controversie begins and ends in Force and Military Tumult, and he that hath the best Interest, or the best Reputation for Valor, Experience and Conduct a-

among the Souldiery, is thought the fitteſt Man to make a King, and the Nobility and Gentry do uſually at laſt conſpire and centre in him whom they want the Intereſt or Courage to oppoſe, ſo that what the Angel ſaid of *Iſhmael*, is true of him, *He is a wild Man, his Hand is againſt every Man, and every Man's Hand againſt him*, and yet by his Power and Intereſt in a Populace or an Army, he ſhall be able to dwell in the Preſence of all his Brethren, and be too hard for all his Competitors and Rivals. And yet after all, when he is placed upon the Throne, there are theſe following Inconveniences will naturally attend it. *Firſt*, being bred up in Hazards and Embroilments, and being forced at any rate to cut his Paſſage through Difficulties, and make his Way through Dangers; he will not have that Air of Sweetneſs and Benignity which is natural and peculiar to the Hereditary Monarch, whoſe Temper was never ſharpned or embittered by an Ambition or Cruelty which it does not need. *Secondly*, when he comes to ſuch Greatneſs out of meaner Circumſtances, and perhaps out of the meaneſt, as there is nothing more uſual in ſuch Methods of Advancement to an Imperial Fortune, he cannot

not bear his Greatneſs with any tolerable Equality of Mind, he reflects not ſufficiently upon his former Meanneſs, a Thought that is too little for his preſent Circumſtances, and a Thought that ſeems irkſome and upbraiding to him; but with Pride and Inſolence, that draws Hatred after it, he treads too hard upon the Steps that raiſed him; he tramples upon thoſe whom Honour, Gratitude and Duty, do all of them very powerfully oblige him to protect, and whom he ought to govern with Juſtice and Moderation. *Thirdly*, as he did not climb up to the Throne without Difficulty, ſo neither can he ſtand or ſit there without Envy, and this makes him Jealous, and Jealouſie makes him Cruel, and Cruelty breaks out into arbitrary Meaſures and ſanguinary Courſes, which was the true Cauſe of the frequent Executions, eſpecially amongſt the Great Ones, under the Government of the Roman Emperors, who being the Creatures of Military Power, which like every giddy Multitude, is a changeable Intereſt, and ſubject every day to new Impreſſions, they had a natural and a perpetual Dread upon themſelves, of all that grew powerful and gracious in the Camp, of the Governours of their Provinces

vinces, the Generals of their Armies, and of all that converſed or correſponded with them in the Court, or were ſuſpected or repreſented ſo to do, and therefore to prevent and obviate their own, they were always contriving and compaſſing the Ruine of their Imaginary Rivals, and when they could not find real Plots to juſtifie the Outrages of Jealouſie and Revenge, they made them to palliate the Injuſtice of thoſe Paſſions, till at laſt the Danger return'd from whence it came, and the laſt Act of the Tragedy was reſerved for themſelves; and yet this Government, as Arbitrary as it was, yet conſidering that it was never ſetled by Inheritance in a Lineal Deſcent, and that ſo vaſt an Empire could never be adminiſtred without ſo great a Military Force as would perpetually endanger the Emperors themſelves, by the Artifices of ill Men, by the Diſcontents and Animoſities to which ſuch arbitrary Bodies are expoſed, and by the Dangers ſuch Diſcontents do unavoidably produce, when the Malecontents compare their Imaginary Injuries with their real Power, yet it was the beſt that Nature could provide in ſuch a Circumſtance and Poſture of Affairs, and was much more tolerable

tolerable than the Power of Equals, perpetually ſhocking and ſhattering the Common-Wealth, and dividing it almoſt into as many Factions, as there were great Men to head them, or Ambitions to be gratify'd, and to ſet up for themſelves. *Fourthly* and laſtly, an Elective Monarch is naturally Covetous, for the Reaſons that have been already largely repreſented, and this Diſpoſition of his draws many and great Inconveniences after it, which have been likewiſe conſidered, and if the Exorbitant Power of the Elective Prince, be limited and reſtrained as to the Exerciſe of it, by that of Dyets, or Parliamentary Conſtitutions, as it is in *Poland* and *Lithuania* at this day; where the Power of their Dyets is ſo ſacred and ſo ſtrict, that the Prince is in a manner manacled and fettered by them; yet from hence another, and a greater Inconvenience ariſes to the Public, from the interfering Politics of the Prince and People, by the difficulty and ſlowneſs of Debates, and by the Delays and Faintneſſes that are uſually to be met with in the Execution of their concerted Deſigns; ſo that oftentimes an Aſſembly is broken up without coming to any Iſſue in their Councils, or elſe the Time is ſo far ſpent

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in fruitleſs Controverſies among themſelves, till the Opportunities of Action are let ſlip. So that ſuch an Alliance is not to be truſted to, and ſuch an Enemy is but ſeldom to be feared, and the Strength of ſuch a Nation, however great and formidable in it ſelf, is rendered uſeleſs at Home, and contemptible Abroad; and theſe are the manifeſt and apparent Miſchiefs to which an Elective Monarchy is expoſed.

But yet it muſt be granted, though the Monarchy of *Adam* were of Divine Inſtitution, and ſo was that of *Seth*, and of *Noah* after them, though *Shem*, and *Ham*, and *Japheth* were by God ordained to be the Kings of their Reſpective Families, and the Fathers of mighty Nations to be deſcended from them, though *Iſhmael* the Son of the Bond-woman was likewiſe the King and Father of a numerous, or rather numberleſs People, which God had promiſed *Hagar* ſhould iſſue from her Loyns; though *Abraham*, the Father of the Faithful, were at the ſame time the King and Sovereign of his particular Family, not only by Divine Appointment, but alſo by that which is next to it, an univerſal Conſent all over the *Eaſt*, by which it came to paſs that the Father of every Family was a King and an ab-

abſolute Monarch within himſelf, though all the Judges of *Iſrael* were immediately conſtituted by God himſelf, and endued with ſpecial Aſſiſtances of his Spirit, for the due Execution of ſo great a Truſt. *Laſtly*, though the Kings of *Iſrael* were eſtabliſhed in a Lineal and Hereditary Courſe, the Original of which was of Divine Deſignation, which Method likewiſe, to avoid Confuſion, was equally eſtabliſhed in the Houſe of *Aaron*, and in the High Prieſthood it ſelf; ſo that not only Monarchy, but alſo the Lineal Succeſſion of it was unqueſtionably in ſome places of Divine Appointment, and the Hereditary was certainly the only one which God ever eſtabliſhed, where he did not conſtitute Judges and Kings by Name, which was the firſt Form of Polity in the Jewiſh Nation, after its Deliverance by *Moſes* out of *Ægypt*; (as it is likewiſe in it ſelf the moſt natural and eaſie, and the leaſt ſubject of any to Diſturbances and Broils;) yet we muſt not imagine, that in all Places in the World, where an Hereditary Monarchy hath obtained, though the Original of that Form of Government cannot be traced, nor the firſt King be certainly aſſigned, that therefore the firſt King in every Territory

was of Divine Appointment, though being veſted with the Regal Power, he had a Divine Stamp of Authority impreſs'd upon him; but the firſt Kings in moſt places, after ſeveral Families began to unite themſelves under one Sovereign Polity, where either by Force or Conſent, and for the ſame reaſon that the Hereditary Courſe was found moſt expedient, and therefore always practiſed in the Government of Families, in which the eldeſt Son antiently ſucceeded in the Kingſhip and Prieſthood to his Father, for the preventing of Striſe and Emulation between Brethren; it was afterwards naturally continued in the greater Polities, if they were compacted by mutual Conſent; but where Force gave the Riſe and Original to Succeſſive Empires, there, either by the ſame Force that firſt gave being to them, they were afterwards maintained, which is not ſo very likely, conſidering how hated a Thing, and how weak a Principle of laſting Power the ſtrongeſt Tyranny and Uſurpation is, which for being violent, is for that very Reaſon in ſo much the greater Danger of being overturned, or elſe it proceeded from a Cauſe more probable, that they that made uſe of Force for the Attainment of Empire and Dominion,

minion, did afterwards endeavour by Gentleneſs and by Mercy, to make their Government eaſie, and the Subjection of their People willing, and to create in Men ſuch an Affection for the Family, as well as for the Perſon of their King; that they would chuſe and covet to be governed by their Deſcendants, and that it ſhould not be in the Power of any turbulent or ambitious Spirit to raviſh that Government out of their Hands, which though eſtabliſhed by Power, might yet be continued by Choice, and by the concurrent Affections of the People, and this is common to both theſe ſorts of Succeſſion, whether they derive at firſt from Uſurpation or Conſent; that the deeper the Succeſſion is, the more ſecure and inviolable are thoſe Sovereign Princes that are inveſted with it, not only as to their Perſons, which God by his Providence, and the People by Submitting to a long Courſe of Succeſſion, which is a ſilent Choice, have anointed; but as to their Prerogatives and Regal Rights, becauſe the Foundation of Property is Poſſeſſion, and the older this Poſſeſſion is, the more ſacred is the Property that ariſes from it, becauſe to call old Properties into queſtion, is in its Conſequence to diſturb all new ones, and

all that are of equal ſtanding with it ſelf, and to ſhake the very Pillars upon which they ſtand, which in the laſt reſult are nothing elſe but Poſſeſſion and Conſent; but the Property, which is the Prerogative, of Kings is therefore infinitely more ſacred than any private Right, becauſe the Danger accruing from the Diſturbance of it, is infinitely greater than in the other Caſe. It cannot be invaded without a great deal of Blood-ſhed, nor the Invaſion be defended without a long Courſe of Violence and Uſurpation; it is the Head and Maſter Property of a Nation, by which all other Properties are aſſerted, and a Property that can never be broken in upon without laying open all other private Encloſures, and in its Conſequence it threatens the Deſtruction of of the World, the Overturning of all Governments, the making all Cities deſolate, all Countries waſt, and all Property precarious, arbitrary and uncertain; ſo that did Subjects but truly underſtand how ſafe they are in the Prerogative of the Prince, and how much their own Properties are bound up with it, even where it is exerciſed with the greateſt Rigor, they would no longer hearken to the pernicious Doctrine of thoſe pretended Stick-

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lers for Libertie and Priviledge, who will needs be inſinuating into unwary Minds, as if the Safety of the Subject, and the Prerogative of the Prince were inconſiſtent together, whereas indeed the one is plainly ſupported by the other, and even the Abuſe of it is a more tolerable thing than the Attemps of turbulent or unwary Men to invade it, it is like the cutting off of *Sampſons* Hair, to rob him of his Strength, and to prevent the Jealouſies to avert or obviate the leſſer Miſchiefs that ariſe from thence, to let in the *Canaanites* and the *Philiſtines* to deſtroy us.

But it is pleaſant to conſider, that as the King is the Image and Vicegerent of God, and as the Succeſſion of Kings to one another in the ſame Royal Pedigree and Line, is an Imitation, the moſt lively and perfect that can be drawn, of that eternal Duration which he paſſes through, when the King lives in his Poſterity, as God does in himſelf; ſo the longer the Succeſſion laſts, the deeper and the older it grows; the more perfect is the God-like Mixture in the Prince of Goodneſs with his Juſtice, the more prone he is to Mercy in the midſt of Puniſhment, and in the height of aggravated Guilt, and the more ſecurely he

he enjoys himself with quiet and assurance from any fear of Danger, and makes the nearer Approaches to the lasting Peace and undisturbed Tranquillity of the Divine Mind; he apprehends no Competitor, he fears no Rival, he sees his happy Successor before his Eyes, and as he receives, without exacting, the Homage and Tribute of the present Age, so he foretasts with pleasure the Obedience of the future, which will be paid to himself in his Descendants, and triumphs over Death in an Immortal Pedigree, at the same time when he yields to its cold Embraces in a frail and mortal Person. He hath no Temptation to be cruel or unjust, no Interest to gratifie by Covetousness or Oppression, but he finds himself most happy in doing Good to his People, most pleased with their Prosperity, most delighted with their Welfare, most desirous and most proud of their Kindness and Good-will, which is to him instead of a thousand Triumphs; more precious than Wreaths besprinkled with rebellious Blood, or Hands embrued in Jealousie and Revenge; and still every Age, the Security grows the stronger, and the natural Mildness and Benignity of the Prince, by Custom, by Education, and by Constitution, encreases and strengthens it self together with it,

it, like Waters that run through a Medicinal or a Chalky Soil, they are always the more operative, or the more ſweet at the Fountain, the longer their Paſſage under Ground hath been. And this is not only true forward from the Prince to the People, as they ſay Love is uſually more paſſionate in the Deſcent, but alſo upward and back again from the People to their Prince, who are always moſt prone to obey and ſerve the Maſters, they have been uſed to for ſo long a time, and will ſooner endure Oppreſſion from an Hereditary Prince, who hath a kind of Merit and Supererrogation of his Anceſtors to attone for Injuſtice in himſelf, than ſubmit their gall'd Necks to the more pliant Yoak of a Military Upſtart, or an Elective Pretender: and though in ſome Countries by many Provocations, or by a vain perſwaſion that Providence hath diſcarded him, when they diſcern him unfortunate and unſucceſsful, they are at laſt prevailed with, contrary to their Duty, to withdraw their Homage and Obedience from their natural and rightful Sovereign, and ſet up another in his ſtead, yet, even in this caſe, neither Anger nor Superſtition can prevail with them to forſake his Family, together with his Perſon, but they ſtill retain

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an Affection for the Line, as may be ſeen in many Inſtances of the Ottoman Empire, in the Accounts given us of former Times, beſides what hath hapened not many Months ago, in the laſt ſurpriſing Revolution.

How happy then are we in ſo long a Succeſſion of Heroic Kings, that have been inured to Juſtice and to Mercy from the moſt antient Boundaries of Time and Fame: that ſeem to have begun their Courſe together with the Sun, and hitherto have contended with him, who ſhall ſet the lateſt, and have improved in every Age in the Myſteries of Government, in the Fineneſs, and exactneſs of an imperial Conſtitution, and in the habitual Advantages of Birth and Education, by which they are equally fitted at the ſame time to oblige and to command, to extort the Duty and Affection of their Subjects, and to provoke their Love, their Admiration and Fear.

Again, as Monarchy is in general the beſt of Governments, and an Hereditary Monarchy the beſt of Monarchies, it being that which God himſelf eſtabliſh'd for the Security and Safety of his peculiar People; ſo more particularly, of all the Governments that ever were ordained by God, or ſubmitted to by Men, there is none ſo happy as our Engliſh Conſti-

Constitution, which is not only a Monarchy, and an Hereditary one too, but takes in likewise the Democratic Form, and that of Aristocracy together with it, and excluding the Imperfections of each of these several Forms; it hath the Perfections and Quintescence of them all; for the Peers or the Commons have nothing to do in the Execution of Laws, any otherwise than as Authoriz'd or Commission'd by the King, nor in the making of them neither, any otherwise, than as their Humble Remonstrance and Advice is ratified and confirmed by him; but they are the Kings Councellors when ever he requires it, and such is the Goodness of our indulgent Princes, that they send for the best and wisest of their Subjects out of all Quarters and Corners of their Dominions, to know what they want, and how they may relieve it, they bid them go together and consider for themselves, what it is that will make them an happy and a joyful Nation. Not that their Advice lays any kind of Tye or Obligation on the Prince, which would render him a weak, dependant, and obnoxious Creature, instead of being a Sovereign and a King, but only gives him a proper Opportunity of shewing his Royal Goodness in granting their Petition, or in denying it, his Justice or his Wisdom, for though in a Multitude of Councellors there be Safety, yet in

a Multitude of Controulers there is none at all.

If therefore we consider the comparative Advantages of that happy Government we are subject to, with respect to all other Forms or Polities that can be nam'd, if we reflect upon the Justice, Prudence, Piety, and Moderation of our Kings, if we have any regard to our Religious Immunities or our Civil Rites, which are both of them, at this time especially, so mercifully provided for by our present Sovereign, who is no less zealous that they should continue to be the Inheritance of after times, as well as they are the Possession of the present, how great, how many, and how powerful reasons have we to dread the least thought of any Change of Government among our selves, by the Defect or Failure of the Royal Issue? and much more the Dangers and Inconveniences that will attend us, if we become a Province to a Foreign Nation, and run the hazard of exposing our Persons, our Civil and our Religious Rights to be a Sacrifice to Violence and Rapine? And how much cause have we to be heartily and sincerely thankful to Almighty God for the Hopes he is pleased to give us of establishing the Throne, and of securing that Ease and Quiet to our Posterity, which we our selves are so happy to enjoy? How much is it the Interest of us all to praise and magnifie his holy Name, that he hath perfected what

what he hath begun, and to pray that for the farther ensurance of so concerning a Stake, which hath given us so great and dreadful Apprehensions of its being lost, he would be kind and gracious to the two admirable Princesses of *Orange* and of *Denmark*, and cause them to imitate an incomparable Queen, as well in Fruitfulness as they do in Virtue; not that we suspect that Providence, that hath vouchsafed us a Prince, as if it would not preserve the Workmanship of its own hands, and by the Ministry of Guardian Angels, conducting and convoying his encreasing Age to a Maturity fit for wise Counsels, and glorious Undertakings, continue so great a Blessing to us all; but that if there be any so great Enemies to this Imperial Crown, or so bigotted with Antimonarchic Principles and Notions, as to wish for the Extinction of the Royal Line, or any so unreasonably anxious for its Preservation, as to distrust the Providence of God, that hath so plainly and signally appeared in it's Behalf, or any foreign Expectation hovering over us, to seize the Majestic Prey of this renowned and redoubted Empire, and give us better reasons to complain of arbitrary Government, then we are yet so miserable to be acquainted with; the Fears of the one may be dispell'd, and the Wishes of the other turn'd into Despair, and the Ambition of the last defeated

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and disappointed by such a numerous Progeny of English Heroes, as may by themselves, and their never failing Descendants, everlastingly secure and guard the Crown. Neither can we believe otherwise, without great Impiety, but that the same Divine Goodness that hath given us a Prince, and seems so manifestly to have engaged it self in his Defence and Preservation, will also furnish him, besides those Virtues which belong to him by Nature, and by a long Course of Inheritance from his Royal Ancestors, with such peculiar Endowments of his own, as will still further shew the Finger of God in his Birth, by rendering him the Delight and Admiration of Mankind, as well as the long Joy and Glory of these Kingdoms, and let it be our Care, as it is certainly our Duty, to endeavor what we can to deserve good Kings for those that shall come after us, by our Obedience to God's Vicegerent over our selves at present, let us powerfully intercede with the Divine Majesty, by an hearty Repentance and steady Reformation of Life, that his Throne may be established in Righteousness, and that his Years may be continued to long length of Days in himself, and be renewed in his Posterity through all Generations, as long as Time shall endure. *Amen.*

F I N I S.

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